There is one significant difference between then and now: The world powers wanted a war back then. Emperor Wilhelm II's push for a 'small war' between Austria and Serbia was just the sign of how things were. But Austria's hesitation to act, allowed France and Russia to 'mobilise' their positions.
Imagine if Austria had attacked Serbia straight away? Then perhaps it would not have escalated to a great war.
Today, the powers that be are not interested in a war. Remember, the powers that were were rather equal in terms of military strength. Today, they team up to beat on weaker powers.
That is arguable. Austria certainly wanted war with Serbia, but a world war? Absolutely not. Germany certainly didn't want a war, but in the event that war was coming, they were more or less forced to mobilize.
In fact, if you read the writings of the day, there were a lot of people saying that globalization (they didn't call it that) made a world war was impossible, because it was in no one's economic interest. Basically, all of the arguments that people use today to explain why war between the United States and China is impossible -- people used back back then.
> A 1910 best-selling book, The Great Illusion, used economic arguments to demonstrate that territorial conquest had become unprofitable, and therefore global capitalism had removed the risk of major wars.
I apologise, I wasn't clear. I meant that they wanted a war at the scale of the Franco-Prussian War. You are not wrong about the writings of the time, and indeed, the powers themselves believed that the mere threat of such a war would prevent the war from ever actually happening, but the concessions made without firing a weapon.
Imagine, a peace treaty without the actual war. This explains why Germany was trying to woe France out of going to war by suggesting that Germany would occupy some French bordering territory. Today, that would seem completely unreasonable for France to accept. But the thinking was that the economic interests between France and Germany was too important for France, that they would accept such a proposal.
As for the war between Austria and Serbia, it was actually Germany that pressed Austria for the war. At first, Austria was extremely hesitant. And even after the ultimatum was sent, Austria continued to hesitate. The lack of decisive action is what allowed France and Russia to position themselves clearly in the conflict. So much that Germany was beginning to regrets its decision to promise Austria its full support in a war.
And also why Germany decided to attack France and Russia first.
The idea was that a quick decisive war would solve the power imbalance in Europe. The war sort of did that. But it certainly was not quick and decisive. And come to think of it, it didn't actually solve the power imbalance in Europe.
A very interesting point. I wonder what was the flaw in the reasoning. It certainly seems unlikely that a major war would occur between the US and China. I believe this today: that it would just be so incredibly bad for business that it's an unlikely practical outcome.
Has the nature of international relations changed, or have we just gotten lucky? Certainly I think the international (and many-national) perspective on human rights and the rights of persons has evolved since then. A draft of soldiers would be perceived quite extremely in the modern day, and would face staunch and inexorable political pressure except in the face of something like total war. Furthermore, globalization has increased substantially since then. A total war with a breakdown of international trade could quickly result in famine in many areas of the world.
It seems more likely that modern warfare will occur through complex and subtle means like economic and financial sabotage (like the measures that have been used against Iran). Arguably this is going on between the US and China in some ways today, with the weakening of China's stock market, the recent US bans on Chinese products, and requirements imposed on foreign companies by China. However, to all the degree that they're add odds with each other, I fundamentally get the impression that US and China are too rational and self-interested to reach armed conflict with each other.
It's also interesting to consider how culture may have shifted over time. 60 years ago, the population might have had one particular perception about going to war with "the japs" (and Asian ethnic slurs). In the modern day, demonizing Asia feels somehow dated, and it's popular to demonize the Arab world instead. I don't know if this is underlying truth or just media spin, but even though there are significant ideological differences in some way (e.g., freedom of speech), it doesn't seem like USA or other conventionally western countries are somehow "at odds with" Asia, even though from a financial perspective that's far more the case than most parts of the world that area in the media a lot more. I suppose it relates to people chanting "death to the USA" and exploding bombs and things like that. Perhaps also it relates to the fact that there's been far less imperialism from the USA directed toward China and similar territories than toward other areas of the world. Who knows.
Wikipedia has something interesting to say about this: "The partnership between China and the United States, where each nation regards each other as a potential adversary as well as a strategic partner, has been described by world leaders and academicians as the world's most important bilateral relationship of the century. As of 2014, the United States has the world's largest economy and China the second largest. [...] China remains the largest foreign creditor of the United States,[4] holding about 10% ($1.8 trillion) of the U.S. national debt."
"China–United States relations have generally been stable with some periods of open conflict, most notably during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Currently, China and the United States have mutual political, economic, and security interests, including, but not limited to, the prevention of terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, although there are unresolved concerns relating to the role of democracy in government in China and human rights in both respective countries" - so, the things that we have a stake in are unlikely to lead us to war. The USA is not going to go to war with China over its civil rights issues.
"The two countries remain in dispute over territorial issues in the South China Sea. At the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2014, both countries confirmed that they wanted to improve their relationship. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the United States did not seek to contain China,[5] while Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that a confrontation between the two countries would be a disaster." - also unlikely to lead to war. It helps that both countries are essentially atheist states.
The most likely way that USA and China get drawn into war is through some kind of proxy situation with allies that they get drawn into. However, they are so much more powerful than their allied nations that I suspect each party enforces detente. All of this said, it seems plausible that there are tensions brewing on the horizon, with China having 1.3 billion people and USA 320 million. Human capital is an extremely valuable resource. Perhaps we are just fortunate to be in a calm period of history during recent times.
The difference is nuclear weapons. The us civil war/world war 1 model of total war is grinding down your enemy's economy into dust by killing soldiers in the field.
The post 1945 version of this is fighting by proxy, and scoping the fight with the escalation to nuclear annhiliation. Japan would have fought to a stalemate... Atomic weapons changed the rules of the game.
Human capital is valuable, but clearly not everything about it is encapsulated in pure population numbers. The Soviet Union was far more populous than the US, for example.
It might also do to compare spheres rather than the US and China individually.
Sorry I made the point too quickly. Humans are literally cannon fodder for nations in this type of war. Value is close to zero.
The thing that matters most is producing enough stuff to keep society held together and continue to supply weapons and other material to support the war effort. When nations approach the breaking point pre-nuclear weapons (ie. Soviet Union in 1942/3), they give you a hat, dump you off the back of a truck and suggest that you scavenge a gun. That isn't an option with industrial states post 1945.
> Today, the powers that be are not interested in a war.
And I'm glad this is the case. A war between any of the great powers could potentially have catastrophic consequences for almost everyone.
> Remember, the powers that were were rather equal in terms of military strength. Today, they team up to beat on weaker powers.
Maybe this seemed like a acceptable strategy back in the 90ties, but today we see it backfiring on everyone.
Refugees flooding the EU causing EU members to block each other which in turn threatens the EU itself, radicalised Muslims threatening the territorial integrity of China, North Korea going nuts, possibly a bloody civil war awaiting Turkey.
My point is that you can gang up and beat on weak players only for so long until the masses radicalise and become a major threat to your own existence.
I agree. I apologise if my phrasing implied approval of this strategy, that was not my intent.
Our current leader suffer the same weakness as our past leaders: Failure to foresee the consequences of their preferred (and tested) strategies in new environments.
The First World War as practically fought as a classic European war initially. And it was assumed by everyone that it would be just that; another quick decisive war. And it looked like it might almost have been that, had it not been for some strategic blunders by German HQ. Blunders that were sparked by conservative ideas and classic defence strategy.
When the war became entrenched, no side truly knew how to advance. They knew how to defend their position (machine guns), but not how to take the other's positions. That first really changed with the introduction of the tank. But that arrived too late to partake in many battles in that war. The Second World War proved its usefulness to its fullest.
Traditional geopolitical, strategic thinking and military schools turned the First World War into a far bloodier than it could have been. New technology, new warfare tactics among other things have changed they dynamic for war.
Today, new ideologies, again new warfare tactics (think urban warfare), new opponents (not nation states anymore) among other things are again changing the dynamic.
When the First World War ended, the solution to it was the same as always; war reparation without considerations to their consequences. The same thing is happening today; old strategy and military schools are being applied to conflicts to which they do not apply.
It might be because our current leaders are politicians first, and need to secure their popularity among voters. Moreso than our past leaders. But it might also just be history repeating itself. In a way.
> The First World War as practically fought as a classic European war initially. And it was assumed by everyone that it would be just that; another quick decisive war.
About 2M refugees in 2015 (highest number I could find) into a population of ~508M isn't "flooding". For comparison, there seems to have been just over 5M "live births" in 2014[3].
What would be the number you'd consider "flooding"? As soon the significant instability is introduced, it's too much. It depends on the effects, not on the numbers alone.
Good question and I couldn't tell you offhand - but I will stand by my disagreement with "+0.4% from migration is flooding" when "+0.9% from births" isn't.
Babies don't often bring foreign cultural norms and overwhelm social services. Which is why one might be flooded with migrants, but not babies, though there be more babies. It's why rain might cause flooding but not snow. The snow may cause a flood later, but not now.
This is true, but consider the number of births attributable to refugees and other recent immigrants, and consider what kind of cohorts are coming in, and where - the entire EU isn't receiving an even distribution of immigrants.
Mohammed is the most popular baby name in London. The young-adult-male cohort in Germany will soon be dominated by peoples of Middle Eastern origin - most Germans are old, and immigrants are largely young and male. In countries like Sweden, fully 20% of the population is foreign-born or born to foreign-born parents. Cultural change is definitely coming to the EU one way or another. For hundreds of years, until around the 60s, most European countries allowed virtually no non-European immigration. Given the birthrates of native Europeans, we're talking about total demographic replacement in a few generations in many countries. I find it hard to believe that's not going to cause some instability in the short to medium term.
Imagine if Austria had attacked Serbia straight away? Then perhaps it would not have escalated to a great war.
Today, the powers that be are not interested in a war. Remember, the powers that were were rather equal in terms of military strength. Today, they team up to beat on weaker powers.