The post you cite doesn't disagree with what I said at all. It describes the idea of creating fake accounts as a bottoms-up idea spread by cultural diffusion:
Even after carefully following the senior managers in charge of Wells Fargo's bad sales practices, the story still feels like one of cultural diffusion, of anonymous ancient peoples moving across the land and leaving archaeological traces of their passage, like stone tools and animal bones and unwanted debit cards.
It points out that there was probably no conspiracy, no explicit instructions, and that the whole thing was unprofitable:
It seems unlikely that he ever told anyone to open any fake accounts; certainly there's no evidence that he did. It doesn't even seem like he had much reason to want the fake accounts, which after all were not profitable.
What is the "different picture" you think this article paints?
I think that we're talking about different levels of management, and their incentives.
At the C-level there aren't great incentives for the accounts. There's an argument to be made that metrics can boost stock price, but whatever. At the branch management level though, there are definitely incentives to not shutting down the practices, after managers found out about them. Even if there aren't explicit instructions, if managers don't disallow the practice after they discover it, that indicates WF involvement beyond the individuals who actually opened the accounts. Furthermore, firing individuals who complain about the fake account practice is a clear example of corporate culpability in this scandal.
Sure, this might not meet conspiracy standards. But it's hard to unilaterally paint the bank as a victim, when there's so many organs to the bank.
I think you're right; I was referring to upper management (as was fludlight in the original post I responded to), you are discussing branch managers. I agree that branch managers were involved.
I agree with you that if the firings happen as alleged, that's a problem. But note Matt Levine's skepticism, which I share:
But I wonder how many of the 5,300 people fired by Wells Fargo for creating fake accounts now claim that they were actually fired in retaliation for refusing to create fake accounts?...Everyone I've seen or heard interviewed about the scandal describes seeing people create fake accounts, but not doing it themselves.
By describing the bank as a victim, I meant the shareholders.
Even after carefully following the senior managers in charge of Wells Fargo's bad sales practices, the story still feels like one of cultural diffusion, of anonymous ancient peoples moving across the land and leaving archaeological traces of their passage, like stone tools and animal bones and unwanted debit cards.
It points out that there was probably no conspiracy, no explicit instructions, and that the whole thing was unprofitable:
It seems unlikely that he ever told anyone to open any fake accounts; certainly there's no evidence that he did. It doesn't even seem like he had much reason to want the fake accounts, which after all were not profitable.
What is the "different picture" you think this article paints?