> I'm not aware of any theory which has convincingly been able to show that animals are not worthy of moral consideration (but all humans are)
To argue against eating animals, you need a moral theory which shows that animals are worthy of moral consideration.
There is none, that I'm aware of. Not in a strictly rational sense. Utilitarianism does not bridge the "is-ought gap," for instance.
(I actually think the "is-ought gap" is an imperfect way to look at it, but that's a simplified way for me to try to explain my objection to these kinds of theories, which may be understandable to people who have at least taken Philosophy 101).
Personally, I'm quite convinced that it's impossible to create a rationally justified moral theory that grants rights to animals.
What exactly makes humans worthy of moral concern but non-human animals not? How does one justify making that exact dichotomy? How can all moral theories somehow intrinsically make that dichotomy?
One of the most prominent utilitarians (and ethicists of modern times), Peter Singer, argues for moral consideration of animals on utilitarian grounds. There are Kantians who do the same. The point of more significant controversy is the strength of that moral consideration, as put by SEP:
"That non-human animals can make moral claims on us does not in itself indicate how such claims are to be assessed and conflicting claims adjudicated. Being morally considerable is like showing up on a moral radar screen—how strong the signal is or where it is located on the screen are separate questions."
>Utilitarianism does not bridge the "is-ought gap," for instance.
That's not utilitarianism's job, that's the job of a realist moral epistemology. It is perfectly possible, for instance, to believe in moral reletavism or moral objectivism while being a utilitarian. And although I think I side more with the Humean side of the is-ought debate with regard to moral realism, I can also see that moral realists have some good arguments that natural science is not the measure of everything.
>Personally, I'm quite convinced that it's impossible to create a rationally justified moral theory that grants rights to animals.
We're not talking about rights, we're talking about moral consideration. What we do with that consideration and how it figures into our priorities is only an orthogonal matter. Singer, for instance, in proposing that animals have moral consideration, would not say they have rights, in this case it would be permissible to kill an animal to save the life of a human, whereas it may never be permissible to kill a human to save the life of another human.
> Peter Singer, argues for moral consideration of animals on utilitarian grounds. There are Kantians who do the same.
I don't agree with either. In my view, the kinds of arguments they make are not even valid kinds of arguments.
> believe in moral reletavism or moral objectivism
I'm neither of those things, nor do I think they are valid positions.
I realize that it's a bit unfair for me to just say that and leave it there, but I can only spend so much time discussing this on HN.
> We're not talking about rights, we're talking about moral consideration.
OK. I wouldn't modify the substance of what I've said even if I accept that. (Though I don't actually agree with this way of separating out the problem space).
On the citations of Singer/various Kantians/etc.:
It's not my intention to talk past you, it's just that if you say "well, $BIGTEXT has a good argument!", that's not really the kind of thing we can discuss efficiently here. I can make very simple and direct arguments for my views without pointing to some $BIGTEXT.
There is nothing wrong with pointing to $BIGTEXT. In fact, somebody might say "Aha! Now I know I need to go read $BIGTEXT."
It's just that we can't really "go there" efficiently on HN. It's better if you can make simple and direct arguments, so that people can actually grapple with them.
But I know that is not always possible (and this time, I'll grant you, probably isn't, if your views happen to agree with some of the people you've cited).
Forgive me for being direct, but I only wanted to respond to the idea that there are no arguments, or rather, to point out the existence of the arguments if you don't know about them. I didn't want to make any claim as to the validity of the arguments beyond the fact that I think they're convincing, and in general, a large portion of professional philosophers consider them to be too. That doesn't mean they are correct of course (in part or entirely), only that they have some serious weight in the development of moral philosophy.
I find it pretty easy to accept some of the arguments within a certain framework, even if I don't subscribe to the framework itself. For instance, I might think that God may have or not have certain qualities or attributes, according to a theological framework, even though I am an atheist, and the question of God is not at all relevant to me. I operate the same way about many moral questions.
On the other hand, I also realize I should spend some time backing up and at least thinking about my alternatives, even if they are 'null' alternatives where I believe the burden of proof is on someone else. With regard to moral nihilism and the burden of proof, for instance, the moral skeptic may need to explain why moral intuitions are not a good starting point (or dismiss the role of intuition entirely, but she still needs an argument). A moral non-cognitivist needs to get around the embedding problem, for instance too.
To argue against eating animals, you need a moral theory which shows that animals are worthy of moral consideration.
There is none, that I'm aware of. Not in a strictly rational sense. Utilitarianism does not bridge the "is-ought gap," for instance.
(I actually think the "is-ought gap" is an imperfect way to look at it, but that's a simplified way for me to try to explain my objection to these kinds of theories, which may be understandable to people who have at least taken Philosophy 101).
Personally, I'm quite convinced that it's impossible to create a rationally justified moral theory that grants rights to animals.